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Summary 
Growing water extractions combined with emerging demands for environment 
protection increase competition for scarce water resources worldwide, especially in arid 
and semiarid regions. In those regions, climate change is projected to exacerbate water 
scarcity and increase the recurrence and intensity of droughts. These circumstances call 
for methodologies that can support the design of sustainable water management. This 
paper presents a hydro-economic model that links a reduced form hydrological 
component, with economic and environmental components. The model is applied to an 
arid and semiarid basin in Southeastern Spain to analyze the effects of droughts and to 
assess alternative adaptation policies. Results indicate that drought events have large 
impacts on social welfare, with the main adjustments sustained by irrigation and the 
environment. The water market policy seems to be a suitable option to overcome the 
negative economic effects of droughts, although the environmental effects may weaken 
its advantages for society. The environmental water market policy, where water is 
acquired for the environment, is an appealing policy to reap the private benefits of 
markets while protecting ecosystems. The current water management approach in Spain, 
based on stakeholders’ cooperation, achieves almost the same economic outcomes and 
better environmental outcomes compared to a pure water market. These findings call for 
a reconsideration of the current management in arid and semiarid basins around the 
world. The paper illustrates the potential of hydro-economic modeling for integrating 
the multiple dimensions of water resources, becoming a valuable tool in the 
advancement of sustainable water management policies. 
 
Keywords: hydro-economic modeling, droughts, climate change, stakeholders’ 
cooperation, water markets, water pricing, environmental benefits 
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1. Introduction 
Global water resources are under increasing pressures that create growing water scarcity 
and quality problems, which give rise to complex social conflicts and environmental 
degradation. Water extractions across the world have increased more than six fold in the 
last century, much above the rate of population growth (UNDP, 2006). It is estimated 
that about 35 percent of the world population suffers from severe water stress and about 
65 percent of global river flows and aquatic ecosystems are under moderate to high 
threats of degradation (Alcamo et al., 2000; Vörösmarty et al., 2010). 
Water scarcity has become widespread in most arid and semiarid regions, including 
river basins such as the Yellow, Jordan, Murray-Darling, Colorado, and Rio Grande 
(Schwabe et al., 2013; UNDP, 2006). Projected future climate change impacts would 
further exacerbate the current situation of water scarcity in arid and semiarid regions. 
These regions would likely suffer a decrease in water resources availability and 
experience longer, more severe, and frequent droughts (IPCC, 2014).   
Emerging social demands for environmental protection in the form of secured 
minimum flows for water-dependent ecosystems further increase competition for 
already scarce water in arid and semiarid regions, especially during dry years. Water-
dependent ecosystems, such as wetlands, provide a diverse range of goods and services 
to society, including habitat for valuable species, flood control, groundwater 
replenishment, water quality improvement, waste disposal, and recreational 
opportunities (Woodward and Wui, 2001). However, water-dependent ecosystem 
services are external to markets, and their social values are overlooked in water 
allocation decisions. For instance, an estimated 50 percent of world wetlands have 
disappeared over the last century (Finlayson and Davidson, 1999). In addition, surface 
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and groundwater bodies that feed wetlands are common pool resources that could be 
depleted by overdraft leading to the so-called tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).     
Several policy responses have been suggested to cope with water scarcity and to 
mitigate the negative impacts of climate change-induced drought for the different water 
use sectors. These policies include reducing water allocations, water transfers, 
conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water, recycling and reuse of wastewater, 
seawater desalination, improving water use efficiency, adopting water conserving-
technologies, changing crop mix, setting minimum environmental flows, and 
implementing economic instruments such as water pricing and water trade including 
water purchases for environmental purposes.   
These policy alternatives have been previously analyzed in several studies such as 
Howitt et al. (2014); Kirby et al. (2014); and Zilberman et al. (1998). However, the 
existing literature, while assessing solutions to drought situations, using engineering, 
economic and institutional approaches, does overlook one important aspect – the 
strategic behavior of the various stakeholders – that is essential to the stability and 
acceptability of policy solutions aimed at basin-wide drought mitigation approaches that 
may affect differently groups, sectors, and sub-regions. Incorporating strategic behavior 
of various stakeholders vis-à-vis various policy intervention is essential in 
recommending the policy makers among the policies they design. 
This gap is addressed in this paper by developing a game theory framework in 
order to analyze cooperative water management policies to deal with scarcity and 
drought. The paper contributes to the literature on water policy through the inclusion of 
the strategic behavior of various stakeholders, and ecosystem benefits in the river water 
management problem. Several cooperative game theory solutions and stability indexes 
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are used to investigate the propensity for cooperation of the basin users and the 
likelihood for ecosystem protection success under various drought scenarios.  
The cooperative game theory framework is applied to the Jucar River Basin 
(hereafter JRB) of Spain, which is a good case for studying the strategic behavior of 
stakeholders and policies to confront water scarcity and drought impacts from the 
impending climate change. The JRB region is semiarid and the river is under severe 
stress with acute water scarcity problems and escalating degradation of ecosystems. 
Another interesting aspect of the JRB is that there have been already successful policies 
leading to stakeholders’ cooperation. In particular, the curtailment of water extractions 
in the Eastern La Mancha aquifer that were threatening the activities of downstream 
stakeholders (Esteban and Albiac, 2012).   
2. Cooperative game theory framework 
This section presents the game theory framework of cooperative water management 
policies addressing scarcity and drought at basin scale. The river basin includes L users 
(players in the game) with l= 1,…, L., and we assume that the users/players consider a 
cooperative management of the river by agreeing to share water resources with possible 
transfer payments for foregone use of water. This is the concept of flexible water 
allocation rule applied by Kilgour and Dinar (2001) for international river basins. 
Initially, players in the game have predetermined administrative water allocations 
depending on the climate condition. Then a player that needs more water can obtain it 
from another player by compensating that player for using less water and selling the 
saved amount. Assume that all possible arrangements between players are allowed in 
the game. We suppose that the existing infrastructure in the basin allows water 
movements among players.  
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Let N be the set of all players in the game, S is the set of all feasible coalitions, and 
s (s א S) is one feasible coalition in the game. The singleton coalitions (non-
cooperation) are {l}, l=1,..., L, and the grand coalition (full cooperation) is {N}. Assume 
that the objective of the players in a feasible coalition s is to maximize their benefits ݂௦ 
from cooperative water use. Let ߥሺݏሻ be the characteristic function of coalition s, which 
is the best value that such coalition can obtain. The cooperative game theory problem 
takes the following form: 
                          ߥሺݏሻ ൌ ܯܽݔ ݂௦ ൌ ∑ ሺܤ௟ െ ߱ · ܹ ௟ܵሻ௟א௦                                     (1) 
subject to 
                                         ܹ ௟ܷ ൑ ܣܣ௟ ൅ ܹ ௟ܵ      ׊݈ א ݏ                                            (2) 
                                        ∑ ሺ߱ · ܹ ௟ܵሻ௟א௦ ൌ 0                                                      (3) 
                                                     ܹ ௟ܵ ڙ 0                                                                 (4) 
where Bl is the private benefit from water use of player l in coalition s and ߱ · ܹ ௟ܵ  is the 
water transfer payment to/from player l from/to the pool, with ߱ being the payment per 
cubic meter and ܹ ௟ܵ being water exchanged to/from player l. The water constraint (2) 
states that the water use ܹ ௟ܷ by each player l, must be less than or equal to the sum of 
that player administrative water allocation AAl, and the water exchanged ܹ ௟ܵ. Equation 
(3) states that money transfer among members of coalition s must be balanced. Water 
and money transfers are restricted to occur between coalition members only.  
A necessary condition for cooperation in the basin is that the benefits obtained 
under cooperation are greater than the benefits obtained under non-cooperation (or 
current situation). When additional benefits are achievable through cooperation, the 
main challenge is to fairly and efficiently allocate them among the cooperating players. 
Such a challenge can be addressed through allocation of the benefits from cooperation 
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using cooperative game theory concepts. Let Ω௟஼ be the allocated cooperative benefit 
(payoff) to player l. An appropriate allocation under cooperation should satisfy the 
following constraints: 
                                     Ω௟஼ ൒ ߥሺሼ݈ሽሻ       ׊݈ א ܰ                                                 (5) 
                                    ∑ Ω௟஼௟א௦ ൒ ߥሺݏሻ   ׊ݏ א ܵ                                                 (6) 
                                     ∑ Ω௟஼௟אே ൌ ߥሺܰሻ                                                            (7) 
Equation (5) fulfills the condition for individual rationality, which means that the 
allocated benefits from full cooperation to player l must be greater than or equal to its 
benefits from non-cooperation. Equation (6) fulfills the group rationality condition, 
which means that the sum of full cooperative benefit allocations to any group of players 
must be greater than or equal to the total obtainable benefits under any coalition s that 
includes the same players. Equation (7) fulfills the efficiency condition, which means 
that the total obtainable benefits under the grand coalition must be allocated to the 
members of that coalition.  
An allocation that satisfies these three requirements is in the Core of the 
cooperative game (Gillies, 1959). The Core is a set of game allocation gains that is not 
dominated by any other allocation set. The Core provides information about the range 
of acceptable solutions for each player and allows ranking the players’ preferences over 
the possible cooperative solutions. Satisfying the Core conditions for a cooperative 
solution is a necessary condition for its acceptability by the players. Therefore, solutions 
not included in the Core are not acceptable and not stable (Shapley, 1971).  
Three cooperative game theory solution concepts are used in this paper to allocate 
the gains from cooperation among the players: the Shapley value, the Nash-Harsanyi, 
and the Nucleolus. These solution concepts have been applied in previous studies for 
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different water management problems such as Dinar and Howitt (1997); and Wang et al. 
(2008). 
The Shapley value is a uniquely defined solution to an n-player cooperative game 
in the characteristic function form. The Shapley value allocates Ω௟ௌ௛ to each player 
based on the weighted average of their contributions to all possible coalitions. In the 
calculation, an equal probability is assigned for the formation of any coalition of the 
same size, assuming all possible sequences of formation (Shapley, 1953). The Shapley 
solution takes the following form: 
                   Ω௟ௌ௛ ൌ ∑ ሺ௅ି|௦|ሻ!ሺ|௦|ିଵሻ!௅!௦אௌ௟א௦ · ൫ߥሺݏሻ െ ߥሺݏ െ ሼ݈ሽሻ൯   ׊݈ א ܰ               (8) 
where |ݏ| is the number of players participating in coalition s, and L is the total number 
of players in the allocation game.   
The Nash–Harsanyi solution (Harsanyi, 1959) to an n-person bargaining game is a 
modification to the two-player Nash solution (Nash, 1953). This cooperative solution 
provides a unique allocation solution that is in the Core of the game (if it is not empty) 
by maximizing the product of the grand coalition players’ obtained benefits from 
cooperation compared to non-cooperation. The Nash-Harsanyi solution takes the 
following form: 
                                       ܯܽݔ ∏ ሺΩ௟ேு௟אே െ ߥሺሼ݈ሽሻሻ                                        (9)  
subject to the Core conditions (equations (5) to (7)), where Ω௟ேு is the Nash-Harsanyi 
benefit allocation and ߥሺሼ݈ሽሻ is the non-cooperative benefit of player l. 
The Core of a cooperative game in the characteristic function form may be empty 
because certain partial coalitions provide greater payoff than the grand coalition. 
Conversely, conditions may arise where the Core does exist but is too large and leaves 
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the allocation problem open for further bargaining. The Nucleolus solves this problem 
by minimizing the worst inequity or dissatisfaction of the most dissatisfied coalition 
(Schmeidler, 1969). The Nucleolus of the benefit allocation game can be determined by 
finding ߝ through the following optimization model: 
 
                                                    ܯܽݔ ߝ                                                             (10) 
subject to 
                                        ߝ ൑ ∑ Ω௟ே௨௟א௦ െ ߥሺݏሻ     ׊ݏ א ܵ                                          (11) 
                                         ∑ Ω௟ே௨௟אே ൌ ߥሺܰሻ                                                      (12) 
                                                  ߝ ڙ 0                                                                 (13) 
where ߝ is the maximum tax imposed on or subsidy provided to all coalitions to keep 
them in the Core. Solving equations (10) to (13) provides a fair and efficient allocation 
of benefits to the players, based on the Nucleolus fairness principle. The Nucleolus 
allocation Ω௟ே௨ is a single solution that is always in the Core, if the Core is not empty.   
To ensure that a cooperative solution works adequately in practice, not only should 
it be in the Core, but also it has to be stable. Being in the Core is a necessary condition 
for acceptability of a cooperative solution by the players, but it does not guarantee 
stability for a solution, as some players may find it unfair. Solutions that are viewed as 
unfair by some players are less stable. Some players might threaten to leave the grand 
coalition and form partial coalitions because of their critical position in the grand 
coalition. The stability of any solution is important given the existence of considerable 
fixed investments and transaction costs, so that a more stable solution might be 
preferred even if it is harder to implement. Therefore, some methods are suggested to 
find the most stable and likely cooperative outcomes.  
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Loehman et al. (1979) used an ex-post approach to measure power in a cooperative 
game. This approach is similar to the one suggested by Shapley and Shubik (1954) for 
measuring power in voting games. The Loehman power index (ߠ௟௔) compares the gains 
to a player with the gains to the coalition. The power index (ߠ௟௔) is the following:  
                 ߠ௟௔ ൌ Ω೗ೌ ିజሺሼ௟ሽሻ∑ ቀΩ೗ೌ ିజሺሼ௟ሽሻቁ೗אಿ   ,   ∑ ߠ௟
௔ ൌ 1௟אே ,   ܽ ൌ ݄ܵ, ܰܪ, ܰݑ                  (14) 
where Ω௟௔ is the allocation solution for player ݈ using the game theory solution concept 
ܽ. The power index is used as an indicator of the stability of the allocations for the 
different cooperative solutions. The higher the power index of a player, the higher that 
player’s propensity for cooperating and staying in the grand coalition. If the power is 
distributed more or less equally among the players, then the coalition is more likely to 
be stable. The coefficient of variation of the power indexes of the different players is 
defined as the stability index of the grand coalition ߠ௔തതത. The greater the value of ߠ௔തതത the 
larger the instability of the allocation solution.  
 The theoretical cooperative game theory framework proposed in this section is 
applied to the water management problem in the JRB. The next section describes the 
empirical river basin model of the JRB that is used to calculate the value of the 
characteristic function of various cooperative (or coalitional) arrangements.   
3. Empirical river basin model  
The empirical river basin model includes the main users in the JRB: irrigation activities, 
urban uses, and aquatic ecosystems needs. A specific model for optimizing each and all 
water use sectors has been built, and these models are linked, using a reduced form 
hydrological model developed and calibrated to the JRB conditions by Kahil et al. 
(2014). 
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Figure 1. Map of the Jucar River Basin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Study area 
The JRB is located in the regions of Valencia and Castilla La Mancha in Southeastern 
Spain. It extends over 22,400 km2 and covers the area drained by the Jucar River and its 
tributaries, mainly the Magro and the Cabriel Rivers (Figure 1). The climate of the basin 
is Mediterranean, characterized by recurrent drought spells and normal years with hot 
and dry summers. Renewable water resources in the JRB are nearly 1,700 Mm3, of 
which 930 Mm3 are surface water and 770 Mm3 are groundwater resources (CHJ, 
2009). Water extractions are 1,680 Mm3, very close to the total renewable resources, 
making the JRB an almost closed water system (Table 1).  
Extractions for irrigated agriculture are about 1,400 Mm3 per year, which represent 
84 percent of total water extractions, to irrigate 190,000 ha. The major irrigation 
districts are: the Eastern La Mancha aquifer district (hereafter EM) in the upper Jucar,  
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Table 1. Water use by sector and source in the JRB in a normal flow year (Mm3/year). 
Source Agriculture Urban Industrial Total 
Surface water  761 118 24 903 
Groundwater 633 104 25 762 
Reuse 11 0 1 12 
Total 1,405 222 50 1,677 
Source. CHJ 2009. 
the traditional districts of Acequia Real del Jucar (hereafter ARJ), Escalona y 
Carcagente (hereafter ESC) and Ribera Baja (hereafter RB) in the lower Jucar, and the 
the Canal Jucar-Turia district (hereafter CJT) situated in the adjacent Turia River Basin. 
Urban and industrial extractions are about 270 Mm3, and they supply households, 
industries and services of more than one million inhabitants located mostly in the cities 
of Valencia, Sagunto and Albacete (CHJ, 2009).  
Expansions of water extractions in the basin and the severe drought spells in recent 
decades have triggered considerable negative environmental and economic impacts. 
Environmental flows are dwindling in many parts of the basin, resulting in serious 
damages to water-dependent ecosystems. The environmental flow in the final tract of 
the Jucar River is below 1 m3/s, which is very low compared with the other two major 
rivers in the region, the Ebro and Segura Rivers. There have been also negative impacts 
on downstream water users, such as the ARJ irrigation district, which has seen 
substantial water availability in the last forty years reduced from 700 to 200 Mm3. 
Consequently, the dwindling return flows from the irrigation districts in the lower Jucar 
have caused serious environmental problems to the Albufera wetland, the main aquatic 
ecosystem in the JRB, which is mainly fed by these return flows (Garcia-Molla et al., 
2013).  
The Albufera wetland is a freshwater lagoon with an area covering 2,430 ha, 
supporting very rich aquatic ecosystems with unique species of fauna and flora. Since 
1989, the Albufera was included in the list of wetlands of international importance, and 
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was declared a special protected area for birds. The Albufera receives water from the 
return flows of irrigation in the lower Jucar, mainly from the ARJ and the RB irrigation 
districts. Other flows originate from the Turia River Basin, and from discharge of 
untreated and treated urban and industrial wastewaters. Currently, the Albufera wetland 
suffers from reduction of inflows and the degradation of their quality. These problems 
are driven by the reduced flows originating from the Jucar River, and by deficiencies in 
the sewage disposal and treatment systems from adjacent municipalities, causing severe 
damages to the Albufera wetland, such as the loss of biodiversity, the decrease in 
recreation services, and the decline of fishing activities (Sanchis, 2011).  
3.2 The model  
The hydro-economic model of the JRB integrates hydrologic, economic, environmental, 
and institutional variables within a single framework. The model accounts for decision 
processes made by irrigators in the five major districts (EM, CJT, ARJ, ESC, and RB) 
and by urban users in the three major cities (Valencia, Albacete, and Sagunto) in the 
basin. In addition, the model includes the environmental benefits provided by the 
Albufera wetland to society. The model runs on an annual basis, and its main focus is 
on the allocation and utilization of surface water.  
In order to link the different components of the river basin model and to simulate 
the spatial impact of drought in the JRB, a reduced form of the hydrological model of 
the basin is used (CHJ, 2009). The reduced form hydrological model is a node-link 
network that allows controlling the flows of water in each node and estimating the 
distribution of the available surface water among the users in each climate condition 
calibrating it to observed water allocations in both normal year (2009) and drought 
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years (2006, 2007, and 2008). This approach to model river basin hydrology has been 
used in several studies such as Cai et al. (2003); and Ward (2009).     
The reduced form hydrological model is based on the principles of water mass 
balance and continuity of river flow, which determine the volume of water availability 
in each river reach that can be used for economic activities taking into account 
environmental restrictions. The mathematical formulation of the model is as follows 
(see Kahil et al. (2014) for further details): 
                            ܹܱௗ ൌ ܹܫௗ · ሺ1 െ ߛௗሻ െ ܦௗூோ െ ܦௗ௎ோ஻                                          (15) 
                            ܹܫௗାଵ ൌ ܹܱௗ ൅ ݎௗூோ · ሺܦௗூோሻ ൅ ݎௗ௎ோ஻ · ሺܦௗ௎ோ஻ሻ                              (16) 
                                               ܹܱௗ ൒ ܧௗ௠௜௡                                                                 (17)              
The mass balance equation (15) determines the volume of water outflow ܹܱௗ from 
a river reach d, which is equal to the net (of evaporation loss ߛௗ) water inflow ܹܫௗ ·
ሺ1 െ ߛௗሻ to d minus diversion for irrigation ܦௗூோ and for urban and industrial uses ܦௗ௎ோ஻. 
The continuity equation (16) guarantees the continuity of river flow in the basin, where 
the volume of water inflow to the next river reach ܹܫௗାଵ is the sum of outflow from the 
previous river reach ܹܱௗ, the return flows from previous irrigation districts ݎௗூோ · ሺܦௗூோሻ 
and, the return flows from the cities ݎௗ௎ோ஻ · ሺܦௗ௎ோ஻ሻ. Equation (17) states that the volume 
of water outflow ܹܱௗ from a river reach d must be greater than or equal to the 
minimum environmental flow ܧௗ௠௜௡ established for that river reach, which is determined 
by the basin’s regulations.  
Information on groundwater extractions by demand node has been incorporated 
exogenously into the reduced form hydrological model. We assume that groundwater 
use in the EM irrigation district decreases as drought severity intensifies, based on the 
observed behavior of farmers in the last two decades (Esteban and Albiac, 2012). 
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Increases of groundwater extractions in other irrigation districts are allowed by the basin 
authority during drought periods. These additional extractions are restricted in the 
model based on past maximum pumping levels (CHJ, 2009). In this paper, groundwater 
dynamics and pumping costs are held constant because of the short run nature of the 
model. Furthermore, the major groundwater extractions in the JRB are those of the 
Eastern La Mancha Aquifer, which is the largest aquifer system in Spain. Any changes 
in its water table level require a very long period of time.         
We incorporate the reduced form hydrological model into a regional economic 
optimization model. For irrigation activities, a linear programming optimization model 
has been developed for each irrigation district. Irrigation districts maximize farmers’ 
private benefits from irrigation activities, subject to technical and resource constraints. 
A Leontief crop production function is used with fixed input and output prices, in which 
farmers are price takers. The optimization problem for an irrigation district takes the 
following form: 
                                  ܯܽݔ ܤ௞ூோ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜௝௞′௜௝ · ௜ܺ௝௞                                                 (18) 
subject to 
                                               ∑ ܣ௜௝௞ · ௜ܺ௝௞௜௝ ൑ ܴ௞                                                      (19) 
                                                      ௜ܺ௝௞ ൒ 0                                                                 (20) 
where ܤ௞ூோ is farmers’ private benefits in irrigation district k. ܥ௜௝௞′  is a vector of 
coefficients of net income per hectare of crop i cultivated under irrigation technology j. 
Aijk is a matrix of production coefficients and Rk is a vector of constraint levels including 
land, water and labor in each irrigation district k. Xijk corresponds to the area of crop i 
cultivated under irrigation technology j in irrigation district k and it is the decision 
variable in the irrigation district optimization problem.  
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For urban water uses, a nonlinear optimization model has been developed for each 
city. The model maximizes the social (consumer and producer) surplus from water use 
for each city, subject to several physical and institutional constraints. The optimization 
problem for each urban center takes the following form:   
        ܯܽݔ ܤ௨௎ோ஻ ൌ ቀܽௗ௨ · ܳௗ௨ െ ଵଶ · ܾௗ௨ · ܳௗ௨ଶ െ ܽ௦௨ · ܳ௦௨ െ
ଵ
ଶ · ܾ௦௨ · ܳ௦௨ଶ ቁ         (21) 
subject to 
                                                     ܳௗ௨ െ ܳ௦௨ ൑ 0                                                        (22) 
                                             ܳௗ௨ ;  ܳ௦௨ ൒ 0                                                          (23) 
where ܤ௨௎ோ஻ is the social surplus of city u from water use. Qdu and Qsu are the quantity of 
water demanded and supplied by/to the city u, respectively. adu and bdu are the intercept 
and the slope of the inverse demand function of city u, respectively. asu and bsu are the 
intercept and the slope of the water supply function for city u, respectively. Equation 
(22) states that the quantity of water supplied must be greater than or equal to the 
quantity demanded. Parameters of the inverse demand functions for Valencia, Albacete, 
and Sagunto have been estimated from the study by Collazos (2004).  
The river basin optimization model accounts also for the environmental benefits 
provided by the main aquatic ecosystem in the JRB, the Albufera wetland. The model 
considers only water inflows to the Albufera wetland originated from irrigation return 
flows of the ARJ and RB irrigation districts. Inflows and benefits of the Albufera 
wetland are given by the following expressions: 
       ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൌ ߙ · ݎ஺ோ௃ூோ · ൫ܦ஺ோ௃ூோ ൯ ൅ ߚ · ݎோ஻ூோ · ሺܦோ஻ூோ ሻ                                           (24) 
    ܤ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൌ ቐ
ߜଵ                                                  ݂݅ 0 ൑ ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൑ ܧଵ
ߜଶ ൅ ߩଶ · ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔                 ݂݅  ܧଵ ൏ ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൑ ܧଶ
ߜଷ ൅ ߩଷ · ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔                 ݂݅  ܧଶ ൏ ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൑ ܧଷ
             (25) 
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where equation (24) determines the quantity of water flowing to the Albufera wetland, 
ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔. Parameters α and β represent the shares of return flows that feed the wetland 
from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively. The products ݎ஺ோ௃ூோ · ሺܦ஺ோ௃ூோ ሻ and 
ݎோ஻ூோ · ሺܦோ஻ூோ ) are return flows from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively. 
Equation (25) represents environmental benefits, ܤ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔, that the Albufera wetland 
provides to society. The environmental benefit function is assumed to be a piecewise 
linear function of the water inflows, ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔, to the wetland. This function expresses 
shifts in the ecosystem status when critical thresholds of environmental conditions are 
reached (water inflows E1, E2 and E3). This functional form is adapted from the study by 
Scheffer et al. (2001), indicating that ecosystems do not always respond smoothly to 
changes in environmental conditions, but they may switch abruptly to a contrasting 
alternative state when these conditions approach certain critical levels.  
The river basin optimization model maximizes total basin benefits subject to the 
hydrological constraints and the constraints of the individual economic sector 
optimization models. The optimization problem for the whole river basin takes the 
following form: 
                               ܯܽݔ ൫∑ ܤ௞ூோ௞ ൅ ∑ ܤ௨௎ோ஻௨ ൅ ܤ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔൯                               (26) 
subject to the constraints in equations (15), (16), (17), (19), (20), (22), (23) and (24). 
The river basin optimization model allows calculating the basin benefits under the 
current institutional setting or baseline scenario (the non-cooperative solution) and it is 
the basis for calculation of benefits accrued to users under various cooperative 
arrangements for different drought scenarios.  
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Table 2. Parameters of the JRB model. 
Parameters Value Unit 
Total irrigated area 157,000 ha 
   Cereals area 70,650 ha 
   Vegetables area 21,980 ha 
   Fruit trees area 64,370 ha 
   Flood irrigation area 28,260 ha 
   Sprinkler irrigation area 58,090 ha 
   Drip irrigation area 70,650 ha 
Average irrigation water price  0.05 €/m3 
Average urban water price 0.71 €/m3  
Share of return flows feeding the Albufera  
  ARJ ሺߙሻ 28 % 
  RB (ߚሻ 23 % 
Benefit function of the Albufera from water inflows 
      Intercept (ߜଵሻ 33 106 € 
   First threshold of inflows to the Albufera (ܧଵሻ 51 Mm3 
      Intercept (ߜଶሻ -214 106 € 
      Slope (ߩଶሻ 4.8 €/m3 
   Second threshold of inflows to the Albufera (ܧଶሻ 78 Mm3 
      Intercept (ߜଷሻ 43 106 €  
      Slope (ߩଷሻ 1.8 €/m3  
   Third threshold of inflows to the Albufera (ܧଷሻ 138 Mm3 
Economic value of the Albufera wetland 13,600 €/ha 
Water transfer payment ሺ߱ሻ 0.19 €/m3 
 
Detailed biophysical and economic data has been collected from primary and 
secondary sources and introduced in the models: water inflows to the main reservoirs 
and river reaches, water diversion for irrigation and cities (CHJ, 2009), crop area by 
irrigation system, crop water requirements, irrigation efficiency in each district (GCLM, 
2009; GV, 2009; INE, 2009), costs and revenues by crop, and water costs and prices by 
sector (CHJ, 2009; Collazos, 2004; MARM, 2010). Time series data of various 
ecosystem health indicators of the Albufera wetland, and economic valuation estimates 
collected from several studies have been used for the estimation of the environmental 
benefit function of the wetland (Brander et al., 2006; CHJ, 2009; Del Saz and Perez, 
1999; Woodward and Wui, 2001). Figure A1 in the appendix shows the environmental 
benefit function of the Albufera wetland. Selected hydrologic and economic parameters 
of the JRB model are shown in Table 2. The river basin model and the cooperative 
game theory application have been run using the GAMS package. 
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3.3 Scenario simulation 
The main water users in the JRB (described in section 3.1) are classified into four 
players that have similar characteristics regarding water use and their relation with the 
Albufera wetland. Players in the JRB game are: irrigation districts linked to the 
Albufera including the ARJ and RB irrigation districts (hereafter IE); irrigation districts 
not linked to the Albufera including the EM, CJT, and ESC irrigation districts (hereafter 
INE); the cities including Valencia, Sagunto and Albacete (hereafter C); and the 
Albufera wetland (hereafter E). This classification will allow us to capture all important 
strategic relationship between players in various locations of the basin and their 
opposed interests, and at the same time to keep the computational burden at a 
reasonable level.    
Two scenarios of water management are presented in this paper to analyze the 
propensity for cooperation among the users in the JRB and the likelihood to protect the 
Albufera wetland. The two scenarios are simulated under normal flow and various 
drought conditions. Drought is classified into three levels, depending on the severity of 
the drought event: mild, severe, and very severe, based on historical data about water 
inflows in the JRB.1 The two scenarios follow:  
Scenario 1: This scenario applies the flexible water allocation rule described in section 
2 (equations (1) to (4)).2 Under this scenario, player E (the Albufera wetland) receives 
                                                            
1 The characterization of drought severity is done by dividing equally the range between the mean and the 
minimum water inflows for the period 1989-2011, following the classification of the JRB authority. 
2 A similar cooperative arrangement already implemented in the JRB is the Alarcon agreement of 2001, 
which transferred the ownership of the Alarcon dam from the traditional irrigation districts, with seniority 
rights, to the basin authority in exchange for guarantees on water rights and water use priority to those 
districts. The agreement establishes that during drought situations, selected users could continue using 
surface water from the Jucar River but they have to pay an economic compensation to the traditional 
districts that are reducing surface extractions. Additionally, the traditional districts get a special 
authorization to substitute surface water with groundwater during drought, and the compensation covers 
the costs of groundwater pumping (CHJ, 2009). 
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water from return flows generated by player IE. The Albufera wetland is a weak player 
in the game because it does not compete for water (there is no water sharing or transfer 
payments from/to Albufera).  
Scenario 2: This scenario applies the flexible water allocation rule and at the same time 
introduces a policy intervention to protect the Albufera wetland by internalizing 
environmental damages. This scenario includes a new variable in the model, which is 
the direct diversion of water to the Albufera wetland. In this case, the wetland is 
competing for water with other users and does not depend passively on remaining return 
flows (although it benefits from return flows as well). The mechanism for direct water 
diversions to the Albufera wetland is that the basin authority pays players to acquire 
their water in order to feed the wetland.  
The water transfer payment per cubic meter in both scenarios is set equal to the 
actual compensation paid by the basin authority to farmers during the last drought for 
reducing groundwater extractions in the Eastern La Mancha aquifer (Table 2).   
4. Results and discussion  
The baseline situation (the non-cooperative solution) represents the current conditions 
of water use and allocation in the JRB. Each player is maximizing its private benefits 
from its administrative water allocation, and there is no cooperation in the form of water 
transfer among the players. The simulation of drought impacts on the JRB in the 
baseline situation includes the measures currently implemented to cope with drought, 
such as the reduction of water allocations to irrigation districts, the increase of urban 
water prices and the conjunctive use of ground and surface water for irrigation and 
urban demand. The results of the baseline situation are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
20 
 
Table 3. Benefits under the baseline situation for different drought conditions (106 €). 
Users Normal flow Mild drought Severe drought Very severe drought 
EM 79.8 71.9  66.4  60.7  
CJT 44.9 40.6  37.2  35.7  
ARJ 34.1 31.0  27.0  22.9  
ESC 7.3 6.8  5.7 4.2 
RB 24.2 20.7 16.5 12.1 
Irrigation sector  190.3 170.9 152.8 135.6 
Valencia 216.3 214.0 206.6 186.9 
Sagunto 26.1 24.1 22.2 16.8 
Albacete 40.2 38.9 38.8 38.6 
Urban sector 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Albufera wetland 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total JRB 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
 
Benefits in the JRB under the baseline situation for normal flow conditions amount 
to 548 million €. Water use is 1,149 Mm3, of which 672 is surface water and 477 is 
groundwater resources. Irrigation activities generate 190 million € (35% of total 
benefits) from using 1,030 Mm3 (90% of total water). The social surplus of the cities is 
283 million € (51% of total benefits) and they use 119 Mm3 (10% of total water). 
Environmental benefits provided by the Albufera wetland are 75 million € (14% of total 
benefits). The Albufera wetland receives 60 Mm3 from the return flows of the ARJ and 
RB irrigation districts, which support the good ecological status of the wetland.  
Results of the drought scenarios indicate that drought events may reduce the 
benefits of the JRB between 63 and 137 million € (11 to 25%). Water use patterns show 
a reduction in extractions of surface water (17 to 52%) and groundwater (4 to 9%). 
During droughts, the main adjustment is sustained by irrigation activities and the 
environment. Irrigation activities reduce surface water extractions (18 to 53%) and 
groundwater extractions (by up to 11%). Irrigation benefit losses range between 19 and 
55 million € (10 to 30% of benefits in normal year) under mild and very severe drought 
conditions, respectively. The reduction in irrigation water extractions has large negative 
impacts on the Albufera wetland that is mostly fed by irrigation return flows. Water  
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Table 4. Water use under the baseline situation for different drought conditions (Mm3). 
Users Normal flow Mild drought Severe drought 
Very severe 
drought 
SW GW Total  SW GW Total SW GW Total  SW GW Total 
EM 13 386 399 9 350 359 5 327 332 1 303 304 
CJT 64 91 155 36 96 132 16 99 115 6 101 107 
ARJ 200 0 200 174 6 180 145 10 155 116 14 130 
ESC 33 0 33 28 2 30 22 3 25 15 3 18 
RB 243 0 243 206 1 207 164 3 167 119 4 123 
Irrigation 
sector  553 477 1,030 453 455 908 352 442 794 257 425 682 
Valencia 94 0 94 81 0 81 67 0 67 53 0 53 
Sagunto 8 0 8 7 0 7 6 0 6 4 0 4 
Albacete 17 0 17 14 3 17 12 5 17 9 8 17 
Urban sector 119 0 119 102 3 105 85 5 90 66 8 74 
Albufera 
wetland - - 60 - - 52 - - 43 - - 34 
Total JRB 672 477 1,149 555 458 1,013 437 447 884 323 433 756 
Note: SW: surface water; GW: groundwater. Total water use in the JRB is the sum of water use in the irrigation and 
urban sectors, and does not include water return flowing to the Albufera wetland. The quantity of urban water use 
shown in the table represents only the part of supply from the JRB. During droughts, the urban sector uses additional 
quantity of water from the Turia River to cover the demand of Valencia and Sagunto. 
 
inflows to the Albufera wetland decrease between 13 and 43 percent, depending on 
drought severity. As a consequence, drought damages for the Albufera wetland under 
drought conditions may exceed 50 percent of benefits in normal years.   
The current water resources regulation in the JRB guarantees the availability of 
urban water to human population. During severe drought spells, the urban demand must 
be first fully covered because of such priority rules. The three simulated drought 
scenarios show a reduced supply to the main cities in the JRB. However, the full 
demand of Valencia and Sagunto is always covered with additional water from the 
neighboring Turia River Basin. During extreme drought periods, the provision of water 
to these cities is shared equally between the Jucar and the Turia Rivers. In the city of 
Albacete, the supply of water during dry periods is amended by pumping groundwater 
from the Eastern La Mancha aquifer (CHJ 2009). The simulation results for the urban 
sector indicate that the provision of surface water from the Jucar River falls between 14 
and 45 percent, while groundwater extractions increase up to 8 Mm3. The benefit losses 
during droughts in the urban sector are below 14 percent in the worst-case scenario,  
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Table 5. Characteristic functions under non-cooperation and full cooperation in 
Scenario 1 (106 €). 
Coalitional 
arrangements Players 
Normal 
flow 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Non-cooperation 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
Full cooperation {INE,IE,C,E} 582.4 (6%) 517.8 (7%) 474.5 (5%) 427.3 (4%) 
Note: The percentage gain in benefits between full cooperation and non-cooperation is given in parenthesis. 
 
because water provision is maintained with additional extractions from the Turia River 
and the Eastern La Mancha aquifer, but at higher costs.  
4.1 Cooperative water management  
The two scenarios of water management described in section 3.3 are simulated under 
different drought conditions using two sets of coalitional arrangements: (a) partial 
cooperation in which the flexible water allocation rule is allowed among different 
combination of players; and (b) full cooperation, in which the flexible water allocation 
rule is allowed among all the players in the game. Tables 5 and 6 present the values of 
the characteristic function under non-cooperation (the baseline situation) and full 
cooperation for different drought conditions in the two scenarios. Detailed results of the 
characteristic function of all coalitional arrangements under drought conditions for the 
two scenarios are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix.  
The results suggest that full cooperative management of water in the JRB achieves 
the highest aggregate level of benefits for the two scenarios and all drought conditions. 
For Scenario 1, full cooperation among users improves benefits between 16 and 34 
million € (4 to 7%) compared to non-cooperation. When a policy to protect the Albufera 
wetland is introduced in Scenario 2, full cooperation improves significantly benefits 
between 195 and 285 million € (36 to 61%) compared to non-cooperation. These 
improvements in benefits of full cooperation under both scenarios occur mainly because  
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Table 6. Characteristic functions under non-cooperation and full cooperation in Scenario 
2 (106 €). 
Coalitional 
arrangements Players Normal Mild drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Non-cooperation 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
Full cooperation {INE,IE,C,E} 742.3 (36%) 735.0 (52%) 710.1 (57%) 659.6 (61%) 
Note: The percentage gain in benefits between full cooperation and non-cooperation is given in parenthesis. 
 
player IE transfers part of its water to players INE and E. Benefits under partial 
cooperation are always higher than under non-cooperation, but lower than under full 
cooperation. For instance, partial cooperation ({INE,IE,E}) between the irrigation 
districts (INE and IE) and the Albufera wetland (E) achieves nearly the same benefit as 
full cooperation. 
The values of the characteristic functions of the JRB game under the two scenarios 
of water management for the different cooperative arrangements and the three drought 
scenarios show superadditivity. This property is important because it indicates that the 
players have an incentive to cooperate. This incentive increases considerably when the 
regulator acquires water to protect the ecosystem. Furthermore, it seems that partial 
cooperation between players IE, INE, and E is sufficient to maximize the benefits of the 
JRB and protect the Albufera wetland, and player C could be excluded from the game 
due to its minute contribution.3 However, these results do not guarantee the stability of 
the cooperative arrangements nor the equity, and the likelihood of failure of cooperation 
remains. Therefore, to keep the arrangements stable and assure equity, the reallocation 
of benefits among the players should be performed through additional transfer 
payments. These allocations are calculated in section 4.2.   
                                                            
3 Player C is called a dummy player, using Game Theory jargon.  
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Figure 2. Water inflows to the Albufera wetland under different coalitional 
arrangements and drought conditions for scenarios 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Thr= Threshold, NC= Non-cooperation, FC (Sc 1)= Full cooperation in Scenario 1, FC (Sc 2)= Full 
cooperation in Scenario 2. The threshold considered is 60 Mm3 and it is calculated based on the minimum water 
requirements of the Albufera wetland and the percentage contribution of irrigation activities to water flowing to the 
wetland. 
 
Figure 2 presents the quantity of water flowing to the Albufera wetland under different 
cooperative arrangements and drought conditions for scenarios 1 and 2. Results indicate 
clearly that policy intervention to protect the Albufera wetland (Scenario 2) is better 
than non-intervention, securing always a fixed amount of water (138 Mm3) flowing to 
the wetland. This amount is well above the minimum technical requirement of the 
Albufera wetland (60 Mm3) set by the basin authority, and thus ensures a good 
ecological status. Moreover, cooperation without public intervention fails to provide the 
wetland with a minimum water threshold that could maintain its good ecological status 
(Scenario 1). Water inflows to the Albufera wetland for severe and very severe droughts 
are far below the minimum requirement. 
We find that achieving cooperation without policy intervention to regulate the 
Albufera wetland degrades the wetland. The reason is that most services provided by the 
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Albufera wetland are public goods, and the private decision-makers in the river game 
have little incentive to conserve water and enhance the provision of such services. The 
Albufera wetland is linked to the IE player (ARJ and RB) which displays a lower value 
of water than the INE player (EM, CJT, and ESC). This is a common situation for 
environmental assets worldwide which are usually linked to subsidiary or less 
competitive activities. In Scenario 1, the IE player gains by transferring water to the 
INE player and receives payments in exchange. Consequently, return flows to the 
wetland decline as drought severity intensifies producing the desiccation and 
degradation of ecosystems. Hence, both policy intervention and cooperation (Scenario 
2) are needed for the full protection of the Albufera wetland under drought. 
The comparison between the two scenarios indicates that public intervention to 
protect the Albufera through direct water diversion to the wetland with transfer 
payments to irrigation districts (Scenario 2), provides high incentives for cooperation. 
The result is a more sustainable use of water and substantial gains in basin benefits. A 
major policy implication from the analysis is that cooperation may have to be regulated 
by public agencies (the basin authority in this case) when scarcity is very high, in order 
to protect ecosystems and increase regional economic benefits.   
4.2 Allocations of the cooperative benefits 
The results of the different cooperative arrangements suggest that cooperative water 
management in the JRB yields higher benefits compared to non-cooperation. The 
challenge here is to allocate the benefits from cooperation among the players in a fair 
and efficient manner. The allocation of benefits is calculated using different cooperative 
game theory solutions. Then, the acceptability and stability of the benefit allocations are 
tested using the Core conditions (equations [5] to [7]), the power index (ߠ௟௔), and the  
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Figure 3. Benefits by cooperative solutions and non-cooperation in Scenario 1. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:N=Normal flow year, MD=Mild drought, SD=Severe drought, VSD=Very severe drought. NC=Non-
cooperation, Sh=Shapley, N-H=Nash-Harsanyi, Nu=Nucleolus.   
 
stability index (ߠ௔തതത). Figures 3 and 4 show the allocated benefits to each player, based on 
the different cooperative allocation solutions.  
Results of benefit allocations highlight that the preferred cooperative solution for 
the players varies, depending on the scenario of water management and the drought 
condition. Player C always prefers the Nash-Harsanyi solution, while Player E prefers 
mostly Nash-Harsanyi in Scenario 1 and Shapley in Scenario 2. Player IE prefers 
mostly Shapley in Scenario 1 and Nash-Harsanyi in Scenario 2. Player INE prefers 
Shapley and Nucleolus solutions in Scenario 1 depending on the drought condition, and 
Nucleolus in Scenario 2.  
The reason for these results lies in the calculation of the allocation solutions. For 
instance, player C does not contribute to any coalition but gains an equal share of 
benefit with Nash-Harsanyi that allocates an equal incremental gain to each player 
based on its original benefit under non-cooperation, irrespective of its contribution to  
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Figure 4. Benefits by cooperative solutions and non-cooperation in Scenario 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: See note to Figure 3. 
 
the coalition. Player E does not contribute either under Scenario 1, but gets an equal 
share with Nash-Harsanyi. Player E prefers mostly Shapley under Scenario 2, because it 
makes a contribution that is rewarded in the Shapley solution. Player INE prefers 
mostly the Nucleolus because this solution discourages the formation of partial 
coalitions. These empirical findings about the preferred cooperative solutions for the 
players indicate the different interests of the players, and may be helpful in bargaining 
aimed at reaching an agreement to share water resources in the JRB under various 
drought conditions.    
The benefit allocations based on the Shapley and Nash-Harsanyi solutions for 
Scenario 1 under different drought conditions satisfy only individual rationality and the 
efficiency condition, but not group rationality. These allocations are not in the Core of 
the game, and they are not acceptable by the players. Therefore the Shapley and Nash-
Harsanyi solutions are not stable, and players may consider defection from the grand 
coalition to create partial coalitions. However, the Core conditions are satisfied for  
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Table 7. Power and stability indexes in Scenario 2. 
Cooperative solution Power indexes of players (ࣂ࢒
ࢇ) Stability index 
ࣂࢇതതതത INE IE C E 
Normal Flow   
Shapley 0.43 0.05 0.00 0.52 1.05 
Nash-Harsanyi 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
Nucleolus 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.99 
Mild drought 
Shapley 0.36 0.13 0.03 0.48 0.83 
Nash-Harsanyi 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
Nucleolus 0.69 0.17 0.02 0.13 1.20 
Severe drought 
Shapley 0.30 0.20 0.14 0.36 0.39 
Nash-Harsanyi 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
Nucleolus 0.48 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.61 
Very severe drought 
Shapley 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.30 0.27 
Nash-Harsanyi 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
Nucleolus 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
 
benefit allocations based on the Nucleolus solution, and they are acceptable to players in 
Scenario 1. In Scenario 2, the benefit allocations based on the three cooperative 
solutions satisfy the Core conditions, and since these allocations are in the Core they are 
acceptable to all players.  
The stability of the cooperative solutions in Scenario 2, which are all in the Core, is 
examined using the power and stability indexes that reveal their practical acceptability 
to players. Table 7 presents the power indexes and the stability indexes in Scenario 2 
for each cooperative solution and drought condition.  
The stability indexes show that the most stable cooperative solution is the Nash-
Harsanyi for all drought scenarios, although for a very severe drought scenario the 
Nucleolus achieves the same degree of stability as the Nash-Harsanyi. The least stable 
cooperative solution is the Nucleolus under normal flow, and mild and severe droughts, 
and the Shapley is the least stable under very severe drought conditions. Scrutiny of the 
stability indexes indicates that the stability of the grand coalition increases as drought  
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Figure 5. Sensitivity analysis of the ecosystem value of the Albufera wetland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: N=Normal flow year, MD=Mild drought, SD=Severe drought, VSD=Very severe drought. 
TPF=Tipping Point Frontier.   
 
severity intensifies. This means that the severity of drought is an incentive to act 
cooperatively.   
The power indexes of players under the Shapley solution indicate that player E (the 
Albufera wetland) has the highest propensity to cooperate and stay in the grand 
coalition under all drought conditions, while player C (the cities) has the lowest 
propensity to cooperate and may disrupt the grand coalition unless improving its 
allocation. Under the Nash-Harsanyi solution, the power is distributed equally among 
the players, which means that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable. The 
Nucleolus solution shows that players E, IE, and INE display a high propensity to 
cooperate. 
The results of the analysis of the stability of the cooperative arrangements suggest 
that the internalization of environmental damages in Scenario 2 provides more stability 
to such arrangements compared to Scenario 1. However, stability of cooperation under 
Scenario 2 would likely to be affected by the economic value of the ecosystem. A 
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sensitivity analysis has been conducted in order to assess the results under Scenario 2, 
and their robustness to different economic valuation estimates of the Albufera wetland 
(Figure 5). Results indicate that ecosystem value and drought condition affect the policy 
decision concerning the protection of the wetland. The tipping point frontier shows 
critical ecosystem values below which the Albufera wetland is excluded from the river 
game and the game stability is reduced. The tipping point moves to higher values of the 
Albufera as drought severity intensifies because of the increase in the economic value of 
water (shadow price) to users.     
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The mounting pressures on water resources from economic and population growth are 
degrading the resources and seriously damaging water-dependent ecosystems, and this 
will be aggravated by the impending effects of climate change. Under these 
circumstances, the efficient and fair allocation of water among users is becoming a 
major challenge for water authorities. New water allocation mechanisms based on the 
involvement of stakeholders are needed.    
The objective of this paper was to test the propensity of stakeholders to cooperate 
over sharing of water resources and the options for protecting ecosystems in arid and 
semiarid basins under scarcity and drought. The analysis was performed using 
cooperative game theory concepts and calculating the characteristic function of various 
cooperative arrangements, using an integrated river basin model. The model was 
empirically tested in the Jucar River Basin (Spain), a typical highly stressed river basin 
in a semiarid region with acute water scarcity problems that are damaging valuable 
ecosystems. 
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Results indicate that drought damage costs in the Jucar River Basin are 
considerable (11 to 25% of benefits), and these negative impacts affect all water users in 
the basin. The impacts are especially significant for irrigated agriculture (10 to 30% of 
benefits) and for the environment (more than 50% of benefits). The cooperation of 
stakeholders through the right institutional setting may reduce drought damage costs in 
the Jucar River Basin between 4 and 7 percent. When environmental damages are 
internalized through the direct diversion of water to the Albufera wetland, the 
cooperative results are more appealing, reducing drought damage costs by 52 to 61 
percent.  
Cooperative water management may be challenging in practice because of the 
strategic behavior of stakeholders, the high transaction costs of organizing collective 
action, and the lack of information and knowledge available for the bargaining process. 
The basin authority can promote cooperative management by creating different 
incentives for cooperation, such as taxes and subsidies, diversion thresholds, monitoring 
mechanisms, and technical advice. The role of the basin authority is especially 
important in protecting ecosystems. Our empirical results indicate that cooperative 
management improves the economic benefits of water users but it may have little effect 
on ecosystems protection without additional incentives or regulations. 
The game theory solutions and stability indexes examined in this paper provide 
information about the possibility for cooperation in the Jucar River Basin. This 
information could be helpful to initiate a bargaining process aimed at reaching an 
agreement to share water resources that could enhance private and social benefits. The 
empirical results suggest that cooperation is a feasible option, but the basis for 
cooperation is weak hindering the acceptability and stability of the cooperative 
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arrangements. However, the internalization of environmental damages provides more 
stability to cooperative arrangements, although it depends on the value of ecosystem.   
The results highlight the fact that various cooperative solutions have different 
outcomes in terms of their acceptability by the players and their stability. This finding 
has important policy implication because it demonstrates the difficulties in selecting a 
mix of policy instruments that could address scarcity, and mitigate the negative impacts 
of climate change-induced drought, and the risk of policy failure.  
While the empirical analysis was performed using the Jucar Basin situation, our 
analytical framework is capable of providing meaningful results to any of the mounting 
cases of climate change-related water scarcity issues in any of the basins in the world, 
including the ones mentioned in this paper. The inclusion of the strategic behavior of 
the parties involved in the drought mitigation policies is new to the policy analysis and 
would add an important aspect to the analysis of policy feasibility under scarce water 
situations. 
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Figure A1. Environmental benefit function of the Albufera wetland.  
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Table A1. Results of the characteristic functions under different coalitional 
arrangements and drought conditions in Scenario 1 (106 €). 
Coalitional 
arrangements Players 
Normal 
flow 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Non-cooperation 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE} 190.6 181.9 170.3 150.2 
{C} 282.7 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.5 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 491.9 470.9 425.5 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,C}  414.8 398.4 379.0 344.1 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 487.3 455.5 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,E}  206.8 158.6 144.4 134.8 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Total 547.7 487.3 455.5 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{IE,C} 341.1 330.0 314.2 282.2 
{INE} 149.1 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{E} 74.8 40.8 33.0 33.0 
Total 565.0 490.0 456.5 415.7 
Partial 
cooperation 
{IE,E} 133.5 94.0 76.6 68.1 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
Total 548.1 490.2 453.5 410.9 
Partial 
cooperation 
{C,E} 357.4 314.2 300.6 275.3 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.8 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,C} 473.3 459.5 441.5 394.3 
{E} 74.5 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 492.5 474.5 427.3 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,E} 299.8 240.8 203.3 183.2 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Total 582.4 517.8 470.9 425.5 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,C,E} 489.5 435.6 412.0 377.1 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
Total 547.8 487.3 455.5 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{E,C,IE} 416.1 370.9 347.2 315.2 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
Total 548.1 490.1 456.5 415.7 
Full cooperation {INE,IE,C,E} 582.4 (6%) 517.8 (7%) 474.5 (5%) 427.3 (4%) 
Note: The percentage gain in benefits between full cooperation and non-cooperation is given in 
parenthesis.  
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Table A2. Results of the characteristic functions under different coalitional 
arrangements and drought conditions in Scenario 2 (106 €). 
Coalitional 
arrangements Players Normal Mild drought
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Non-
cooperation 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE} 190.6 181.9 170.3 150.2 
{C} 282.7 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.5 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 491.9 470.9 425.5 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,C}  414.8 398.4 379.0 344.1 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 487.3 455.5 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,E}  389.6 312.3 190.0 134.8 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Total 730.5 641.0 501.1 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{IE,C} 341.1 330.0 314.2 282.2 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{E} 74.8 40.8 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.9 490.0 456.5 415.7 
Partial 
cooperation 
{IE,E} 166.7 157.5 79.1 68.1 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
Total 581.3 553.7 456.0 410.9 
Partial 
cooperation 
{C,E} 358.6 314.2 300.6 275.3 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
Total 548.9 485.1 453.4 410.8 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,C} 473.3 459.5 441.5 394.3 
{E} 74.5 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 492.5 474.5 427.3 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,E} 459.7 449.5 353.1 283.4 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Total 742.3 726.5 620.7 525.7 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,C,E} 672.3 636.9 540.7 386.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
Total 730.6 688.6 584.2 421.5 
Partial 
cooperation 
{E,C,IE} 449.3 439.4 422.6 389.5 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
Total 581.3 558.6 531.9 490.0 
Full 
cooperation {INE,IE,C,E} 742.3 (36%) 735.0 (52%) 710.1 (57%) 659.6 (61%) 
Note: The percentage gain in benefits between full cooperation and non-cooperation is given in 
parenthesis. 
